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1. INTRODUCTION
Claims to reparations for historic injustice mark the modern global
landscape. Starting in the late 1980s, with the United States' redress for
120,000 wrongly incarcerated American citizens and Japanese ancestry
during World War II, reparations advocates advanced claims on behalf of
African Americans, Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and Holocaust
survivors in the United States; in support of colonized (and/or enslaved)
people in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, Britain and the
Caribbean islands; in response to formerly repressive regimes in South
Africa, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, the Philippines, Korea, Brazil,
Nepal and Cambodia; in reaction to internal genocide in Sierra Leone, the
Congo and Rwanda; in challenge to specific wartime atrocities related to
Japan and Kosovo; and more. Those claims awakened public consciousness
about the horrors of historic injustice and the need for present-day redress.
They also generated controversy and legal and political backlash. Now,
often integrated into reconciliation or social healing initiatives, claims to
reparations are both significant and problematic.
Professor Mari Matsuda's seminal article Looking to the Bottom 2 transformed
legal scholarship on justice. By claiming the subordination experiences of those at
the bottom of societal hierarchies as legitimate jurisprudential starting points, she
refashioned the way scholars think and write about justice.3 And in doing so, she
and others laid the foundation for the emergence of Critical Race Theory and for
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grappling with the ways that race shaped and continues to shape many dimensions
of American life and law.4 For this reason, Looking to the Bottom has been rightly
regarded as path-forging.
What has received less attention is the way that Matsuda, in the same article,
triggered an explosion of legal scholarship on reparations for historic injustice.5
By theorizing about the limits of traditional legal analysis-reparations as individual
legal claims against identified perpetrators-and about the contrasting support for
reparations provided by critical legal analysis-reparations as group-based claims to
repair group-based damage 6-she opened a new way of assessing and justifying
reparations claims. She also identified thorny problems to strategically avoid in
conceptualizing and pursuing reparations. 7
This work and the evolving scholarship that followed over the next several
years contributed to a burgeoning reparations practice, with on-the-ground claims
in courts and legislatures throughout the country (and later throughout the
world).' Those reparations claims in turn faced potent conservative backlash-
some of it thoughtful, much of it vituperative. 9  This political backlash and
skepticism by mainstream judges necessitated a retooling of reparations theory and
practice and renewed attention to many of Matsuda's foundational insights.'o
Although always controversial-whether denominated reparations, redress, or
reconciliation - claims for reparations to heal the persistent wounds of historic
injustice mark the political and legal landscape in the United States and in
countries throughout the world transitioning to democracy.'I
In this setting we cast bright and, in some respects, new light on Matsuda's
foundational theories on reparations. Section 11 summarizes her critique of
limited traditional legal views and then describes her expansive, yet grounded
approach, to reparations as a "critical legalism" and her illumination of theory
through the then-pending Japanese American internment redress and Native
Hawaiian redress initiatives.1 As part of this description, we pay close attention to
her anticipation of obstacles to reparations, many of which later played out on
judicial and legislative battlefields. Section III depicts four evolving past-to-present
generations of reparations theory and practice, with Matsuda's Looking to the
Bottom article as the first generation's starting point.' 3 Finally, Section IV
identifies the present-day relevance of Matsuda's original insights and their impact
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995).
See infra Section II.
6 For a full discussion see infra Section II.
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 374-88.
8 See infra Section III.
9 See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 1, at 374-88.
10 Id.
" Id.
12 See infra Section II.
13 See infra Section III.
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on reparations theory and practice "at the cross-roads,"1 particularly as fourth
generation reparations theory evolves with a multidisciplinary emphasis on social
healing through justice.' 5 We do this through a concise look at startling 2011 and
2012 reparations rulings by the High Court of England and Wales ("British High
Court"). Those rulings recognize the viability of the Mau Mau people's group-
based reparations claim against the British government for atrocities in Kenya
during colonial rule and, in important respects, approach reparations as a "critical
legalism." 16
II. LOOKING TO THE BOTTOM: CRITICAL LEGALISM AND A THEORY
OF REPARATIONS
For Mari Matsuda, reparations is "a legal concept generated from the
bottom." 17 It is "the formal acknowledgment of historical wrong, the recognition
of continuing injury, and the commitment to redress, looking always to victims for
guidance." 18 This early conception of reparations as group-based claims for
continuing group-based damage-informed by those on the bottom-unlocked a
new way of assessing and justifying reparations claims. 19
Then-emerging Japanese American and Native Hawaiian reparations claims
provided the factual basis for her theory of reparations.20 Japanese Americans in
the 1980s launched a redress movement for their internment during World War
II, and Native Hawaiians sought reparations for the overthrow of the Hawaiian
government and loss of land. 2 1  For Matsuda,' Japanese American and Native
Hawaiian group consciousness and experience, along with critical theory insights,
informed an expanded reparations theory generated by looking to the bottom.
" See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV.
1, 31 (2007) thereinafter Yamamoto et al., Crossroadsl.
5 See infra Section IV.
6 See id.
17 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 362. Matsuda describes "the bottom" as "those who have
seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise" and who occupy the lower rungs of the social and economic
ladder. Id. at 324.
" Id. at 397. See Watson Branch, Comment, Reparations for Slavery: A Dream Deferred, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 177, 196 (2002); see also Robert J. Taylor, The Value of Critical Legal Studies in the Legal Education System,
6 THE CRIT: A CRIT. LEGAL STUD. J. 24, 37-38 (2012).
19 ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON 278 (2006) [hereinafter BROPHY, PRO & CON] (referring
to Mari Matsuda's Looking to the Bottom as "the fountainhead of academic writing on reparations"). See also
Rebecca Sharpless, More Than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19
CLINICAL L. REV. 347, 385 (2012) (characterizing Mari Matsuda's Looking to the Bottom as "highly
influential"); Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate, 40
U.S.F. L. REV. 279, 279 n. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Wenger, Causation] (referring to Mari Matsuda's Looking to
the Bottom as one of the "major reparations pieces in recent years").
20 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 373.
2i Restitution for World War 11 Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (Civil Liberties Act of 1988),
50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1988) (Japanese Americans received redress in the form of an apology, monetary
reparations and a public education fund). Native Hawaiians received an apology, but redress has stalled.
See Ashley Obrey, Broken Promise? A Brief Update on the U.S. Role in Native Hawaiian Reconciliation Since the
1993 Apology, HEE (2007), http://www2.hawaii.edu/~nhlawctr/article3-6.htm.
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A. Limits of Traditional Legal Analysis
To open the "doctrinal door" for reparations claims, Matsuda initially
described the liberal legal conception of reparations 22-a narrow concept requiring
proof of wrongful action by an individual perpetrator that causes specific harm to
an individual victim. More specifically, she described three standard legal
doctrinal objections to reparations: (1) the "difficult identification of perpetrator
and victim groups"; (2) the "lack of sufficient connection between past wrong and
present claim"; and (3) the "difficulty of calculation of damages" 23 -and offered
critical responses to each.
First, for Matsuda, reparations claims make new connections between victims
and perpetrators, thus challenging the law's affinity for specific identification of
wrongdoers and victims (concepts of privity, standing, and nexus). In her
transformational view of reparations, described more fully below, victim group
members are connected by the "continuing group damage engendered by past
wrongs." 24 For example, Native Hawaiians are persistently at the bottom of every
socio-economic demographic indicator, and Japanese Americans, though successful
overall by standard indicators, faced pervasive racism and continue to encounter a
glass ceiling.2 5 While not all group members are similarly situated (some are rich
or poor, assimilated or non-assimilated), "the experience of discrimination against
the group is real," and thus, "the connections inevitably exist."2 6
Perpetrator group members are also linked because they "continue to benefit
from the wrongs of the past and the presumptions of inferiority imposed upon
victims."27 While dominant perpetrator group members may deny personal
involvement or racism, they cannot escape their "privileged status." 8 For example,
22 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 373-88. See Maxine Burkett, Reconciliation and
Nonrepetition: A New Paradigm for African American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 117 n.59 (2007) (citing
Matsuda to note that as currently articulated, African-American reparations could "'buyll off protest,
assuage[] white guilt, and throwl] responsibility for continued racism upon the victims'"); see also Dartanyon
Burrow, The Debate Over the Current Reparations Movement, 2 THE CRIT: A CRITICAL STUD. J. 99, 118 n. 123
(2009) (writing that in Looking to the Bottom, Mari Matsuda suggested "that the traditional doctrinal
objections to reparations, such as difficulty of calculating damages, causation, time-bar, and sufficiency of
identifying parties, can be overcome by a liberal and expanded application of legal theories, which is
furthered by examining and acknowledging past and present inequity").
23 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 373-74. See Branch, supra note 18, at 200 (recounting
Matsuda's standard doctrinal objections to reparations); see also Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed Ground:
Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land Associated with Human Death and Burial, 94 KY. L.J.
487, 530 n. 156 (2005-06) (citing Matsuda's list of standard doctrinal objections as part of an "articulatlion
of] the most significant objections to reparations"); Wenger, Causation, supra note 19, at 292 n.54.
24 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 377.
25 Id. at 377-79.
26 Id. at 376.
27 Id. at 379. See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 503-04 (2003) [hereinafter Brophy, Problems] (addressing the problem of causation
as it relates to present discrimination and past wrongs).
" Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 379. See Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and
Reparations: Systemic Reform of Public Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 419, 429 (2006)
(highlighting Matsuda's observations about group liability and the connections between victims and
perpetrators); see also James R. Hackney, Jr., Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation
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nearly all non-Native Hawaiian residents of Hawai'i benefit from the loss of Native
Hawaiian land and sovereignty through their use of former native lands and access
to services derived from revenue from those lands. Thus, "[ulnder [Matsuda's]
reparations doctrine, the working class whites whose ancestors never harbored any
prejudice or ill-will toward the victim group are taxed equally with the perpetrators'
direct descendants for the sins of the past." 29 This is sensible, Matsuda argues,
because the privilege gained from the persistent inferiority of those on the bottom
is a collective benefit to the dominant perpetrator group members. From this
view, "victims and perpetrators belong to groups that, as a matter of history, are
logically treated in the collective sense of reparations rather than the individual
sense of the typical legal claim." 30
Second, Matsuda also challenged the law's penchant for a close linkage
between the alleged act and the present claim (e.g., statute of limitations,
proximate cause, and laches)." She contended that reparations claims are always
timely because they are based on continuing economic harm and discrimination.32
Traditional exceptions to these doctrines, such as disability and fraud, also apply.
For example, the victim groups' injuries-the "deprivation of land, resources,
educational opportunity, person-hood, and political recognition-are disabilities
that have precluded successful presentation of the claim at an earlier time." 33
Likewise, fraud and misrepresentation have delayed the presentation of claims.3 4
Reparations claims justify an expanded proximate causal connection. While
the vertical gap of time in reparations claims is problematic, "[elven mainstream
jurists, however, recognize that the proximate cause question is essentially
political."3 5  In cases of intentional torts, for example, judges often reach "across
wide[] gulfs of time and space to connect act and injury." 36 For Matsuda, "[an act
of racism against a powerless victim is a classic case justifying imposition of a
proximate causal connection."3 7  Indeed, a reasonable person would effortlessly
"predict the harm that would befall Hawaiians from the loss of their nation and
land, or the harm that would befall Japanese-Americans taken abruptly from their
and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99 (2004).
2 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 375.
3 Id. at 380. See Ryan Fortson, Correcting the Harms of Slavery: Collective Liability, The Limited Prospects of
Success for a Class Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White Racial Identity, 6 AFR.-
AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 71, 121-22 (2004)
" Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2 at 374-88. See Brophy, Problems, supra note 27, at 505;
Kaimipono David Wenger, From Radical to Practical (and Back Again?): Reparations, Rhetoric, and Revolution,
25 J. C.R. & EcON. DEV. 697, 703 (2011) Ihereinafter Wenger, Radical to Practical]; Kaimipono David
Wenger, Too Big to Remedy? Rethinking Mass Restitution for Slavery and Jim Crow, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177,
197 (2010).
3 See Burkett, supra note 22, at 123 n.80 (noting Mari Matsuda's point that these continuing harms keep
the "wounds [I fresh," making "the action timely"); see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There Moral
Justification for Redressing Historical Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 127, 195 (2008).
" Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 382.
3 Id.
" Id.
36 Id. at 382-83.
31 Id. at 383.
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homes to the desert relocation centers."3 8
Thus, for Matsuda, an expanded liberal legal conception of reparations
serves classical democratic values of fairness, participation, and
personhood. Viewed in this way, reparations "begins to address the substantive
barriers to liberty" by "rais[ing] the standard of living of victim groups, promoting
their survival and participation." 39 But the rhetoric of this expanded liberal legal
view can "bite back."40 Critical legal scholars and lawyers caution against "neutral
principles and liberal-legalisms" used to privilege those on top.4 1  For Matsuda,
reparations is not neutral-it is "tilted toward the bottom." 42 As such, she retooled
reparations as a "critical legalism," offering a pathbreaking way to assess and justify
reparations claims.43
B. Reparations as Critical Legalism
Matsuda described a theory of reparations that considers "both a victim's
consciousness and the insights of critical legal theorists."4 4  Critical inquiry
"reveals the flexibility of legal doctrine and invites new consciousness of what law
can be."4 5 Looking to victim groups' experiences "suggests versions of liberalism,
legal consciousness and legal doctrine that possess critical power."4 6  She
concluded that reparations-"the idea of acknowledgment of and payment for past
injustice to victims of racism"-is a critical legalism.4 7
For Matsuda, a critical legalism is "a legal concept that has transformative
power and that avoids the traps of individualism, neutrality and indeterminacy
that plague many mainstream concepts of rights or legal principles."4 8 Reparations
as a critical legalism "avoids standard liberal pitfalls" for three reasons. First,
unlike concepts of free speech or due process that are rights extending to all
members of the polity, reparations "is a concept directed at remedying wrongs
committed against the powerless." 49  Second, reparations avoids the ideological
traps of liberal legal or "traditional rights thinking" just described because it
supports group rather than individual rights. Third, "reparations is at its heart
3 Id.
39 Id. at 391.
40 Id. at 392.
41 Id. at 393.
42 Id.
" Id. at 362; see Williams, supra note 28, at 429; see also Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African
Americans, 41 HOW. L.J. 479, 492-93 (1998) (referencing Mari Matsuda and reparations as a critical
legalism); Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1615, 1617-18 (2000) (responding "to Mari Matsuda's work on critical legal studies and
reparations" with an "assessment of the discourse of treaty rights").
" Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 397. See Wenger, Radical to Practical, supra note 31, at 703
n. 49.
4 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 388.
1 Id. at 398.
47 Id.
4 Id. at 393-94. See also id. at 328-30 (for discussions of neutrality and indeterminacy).
49 Id.
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transformative. It recognizes the crimes of the powerful against the powerless. It
condemns exploitation and adopts a vision of a more just world."o It "has the
aspirational, affirming, idealistic attraction of rights rhetoric, without the weak
backbone."5 1
She cautioned, however, that this "progressive tilt" of reparations can "mask
lurking dangers." 52  For example, reparations could "promote[ the idea that
everyone has a price, that every wound is salved by cash, that success merely means
more money." 53  For Matsuda, commodification of victimhood is a serious
concern; yet the shortage of remedial resources in racial communities militates
against the risk of commodification. The monetary award is symbolic: it cannot
compensate for losses of sovereignty or freedom. Nevertheless, "[rlesistance to
commodification is important. If reparations are viewed as an equivalent exchange
for past wrongs, continuing claims are terminated."5 4
Relatedly, some victim group members reject reparations "because of the
political reality that any reparations award will come only when those in power
decide it is appropriate."5 5 From this view, reparations portray the United States
as "benign and contrite"-a "lawgiver and patron."5 6 As such, "[rieparations buys
off protest, assuages white guilt, and throws responsibility for continued racism
upon the victims." 57 To avoid this, Matsuda contends, "victims must define the
remedies, and the obligation of reparations must continue until all vestiges of past
injustice are dead and buried."58 In this sense, reparations is forward-looking and
"is not ... equivalent to a standard legal judgment. It is the formal
acknowledgment of historical wrong, the recognition of continuing injury, and the
commitment to [present and future] redress, looking always to victims for
guidance."59
Finally, Matsuda warned of the effect that reparations awarded to one group
may have on other uncompensated groups. She contended: "[rieparations will
result in a new form of disadvantage only if they are made outside of a broader
consciousness that always looks to the needs of the bottom." 60 Each reparations
award should instead be viewed as a collective "step forward in the long journey
toward substantive equality."6  For example, Native Hawaiians should view awards
already made to Native Americans "not as a chunk taken out of a limited fund,
so Id. at 394.
5' Id.
52 Id.
1 Id. at 394-95.
* Id. at 395. See Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spirit Heating, and Community Activism: Preserving a
Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 659, 678 (2003) (quoting Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 395-96).
" Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 396.
56 Id. at 396-97. See Burkett, supra note 22, at 155 n. 201.
s Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 397.
5 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
61 Id.
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leaving less for Hawaiians, but as a symbol of the possibility of reparations for
Hawaiians as well."
Not only was Matsuda's theorizing about reparations integral to the
development of Critical Race Theory, 63  but it also laid the foundation for
evolving generations of contemporary reparations theory and practice, discussed in
the next section.
III. FOUR GENERATIONS OF EVOLVING REPARATIONS THEORY AND
PRACTICE
Near the turn of the millennium, Alfred L. Brophy observed that modern
reparations theory could be broadly characterized by several overlapping modern
generations of legal scholarship. The "generations" are not sequential time periods
or distinct categories of scholarship; rather they depict intersecting strategies and
movements that have paved the way for reparations claims.
A. First Generation: Possibility for Reparations
Beginning in the mid-1980s, in terms of modern reparations activity, the first
generation theorized that reparations for slavery and other racial crimes were
possible. 64 To open space for envisioning reparations, the scholars "criticlized] the
existing [legal] system . . . and its seeming inability to provide a language for
thinking about reparations." 65
As described in Section II, Matsuda initiated this discourse in 1987, eschewing
the traditional liberal legal view of reparations as an ordinary, if problematic, legal
remedy for redressing individual claims. She proposed group-based remedies for
historic injustices. She argued for reparations that repair the wounds of injustice
persisting over years because of "continuing stigma and economic harm."6 ' For
that reason she contemplated forward-looking remedies aimed at repairing the
material and psychological damage to those subordinated and to society itself to
63 See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, SUPRA NOTE 3;
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000);
MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda,
Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and A Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329 (1991).
6 See BROPHY, PRO & CON, supra note 19; Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the
Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2004) [hereinafter Brophy, Reparations Talk]; see generally
RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 205 (2000) (describing the
foundation for contemporaryAfrican American reparations claims).
6 Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 64, at 82 (describing the three overlapping generations Brophy
identified and adding a fourth, this essay draws substantially from updates and refines material from
Yamamoto et al., Crossroads, supra note 14).
' Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 381.
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"movie] us away from repression toward community."6 7
In Matsuda's view, then-pending reparations claims of Native Hawaiians for
loss of sovereignty and Japanese Americans for internment during World War II
were better understood not as individual claims for compensation, but as
compelling demands to redress the full range of harms from group-based historic
injustice.68 That theorizing laid the foundation for other scholars, particularly
Professors Vincene Verdun and Rhonda Magee, who extended Matsuda's general
vision of redress and called for reparations for African American slavery and Jim
Crow segregation. 69
B. Second Generation: Legislative Reparations
With the then-new Civil Liberties Act of 198870 and Japanese American
internment redress as a backdrop, a second generation of reparations theory
emerged with an emphasis on the legislative arena. According to Brophy, the
second generation "contemplated what reparations might provide and how they
might lead to .. . justice" in the practical world of politics and social movements. 71
Brophy cited Robert Wesley's and Eric Yamamoto's writings strategically linking
narrowly-framed Japanese American redress to far broader African American
reparations claims. Brophy's own scholarship, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 
drew in part upon the dynamics of internment redress - investigative commission,
litigation and legislative action 74 - in calling for reparations for African American
survivors of the 1921 "Tulsa Race Riots" that killed many people and destroyed a
thriving African American town.
Similarly, other American 7 scholars and advocates in the 1990s sought to link
67 Id. at 397.
68 See generally id.
6 Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses To African-American Reparations Theory
in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993) (extending Matsuda's group-based theory to
African American reparations claims); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to
African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 (1993) (making the first contemporary case for legal claims to
African American reparations).
7o Restitution for the World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts (Civil Liberties Act of
1988), 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2000).
" Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 64, at 82.
72 See generally Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 19
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and
African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Racial Reparations] (describing
how internment redress fit the specific perpetrator and specific surving victim legal paradigm).
" ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921 109 (2002)
(hereinafter BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING).
" Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social Healing Through Justice" Approach to
United States-Native Hawaiian and JapanAinu Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 20 (2009)
Ihereinafter Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redressl (describing multiple facets of internment redress).
" See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tuba Reparations: The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 17
(2004).
7 We use the term "American" to refer to the United States and its people, although we acknowledge that
this term can refer to anyone from the Americas and can foster the misconception that the United States is
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litigation and political organizing to achieve comprehensive legislative reparations
for other historically oppressed groups - in particular, African Americans, Native
Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans.77  Those legislative reparations
claims encompassed apologies, individual payments, return of assets or land,
memorials, and public education. 78  And reparations advocacy spread
internationally, 79 highlighted by the urgent and final reparations programs
recommended by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission to redress
decades of white apartheid rule.so Slave descendants in African and Caribbean
countries also sought redress for the long-standing damage of the European
transatlantic slave trade.81 The 2001 United Nations World Conference on
Racism in Durban, South Africa, ignited a Pan-African reparations movement. 82
With the support of activists from over 168 countries, the conference issued a call
for reparations to repair the persisting harms of centuries of government-
sanctioned racism.83 With 3,000 American activists and supporters in attendance,
the U.S. movement merged with the Pan-African movement into a broad call for
slavery redress.84
Back in the United States, however, as anticipated by Matsuda, the African
American reparations movement calling for monetary compensation faced
increasingly strident opposition.as In addition to the opposition to legislative
the only "America." See Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the
Selective Condemnation of "Cultural Practices," 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 75 n.16 (2005) (avoiding the
term "American" unmodified because it overlooks the rest of the Americas, and using "North American" as
an alternative although it conflates the U.S. and Canada); Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Sex and Globalization,
11 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 173, 174 n. 8 (2008) (using the term "Estado Unidenses" (persons from the
United States) rather than "American").
n See generally Pedro A. Malavet, Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 387 (2002); Ediberto Roman, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The
Insurmountable and Yet Transformative Benefits, 13 LA RAZA L. J. 369 (2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K.
Serrano & Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, American Racial Justice on Trial - Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003) (discussing African
American and Native Hawaiian claims) [hereinafter Yamamoto et al., Racial Justice on Trial].
YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 1, at 333.
* See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (describing reparations
initiatives throughout the world, including the Japanese American internment redress in the United
States); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 93 (1998).
" See generally DESMOND M. TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999); Eric K. Yamamoto &
Susan K. Serrano, Healing Racial Wounds? The Final Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS
FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 492 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
" See Jonathan Petre, Blair's Deep Sorrow for Slavery Is Not Enough, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2006, 12:01
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?/xml=/news2006/11/28/nslave28.xml (describing
the Pan African Reparation Coalition Victory).
82 See Yamamoto et al., Racial Justice on Trial, supra note 77, at 1311-14 (describing World Conference
proceedings and call for reparations).
83 Id.
8 Naomi Klein, Minority Death Match: Jews, Blacks, and the "Post-Racial" Presidency, HARPERS MAG., Sept.
2009, at 53, 57-60.
s See also Brophy, Reparations Talk supra note 64, at 135-36; infra notes 95 and 96 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 73, at 117 (noting opposition arguments, including
payments by those not actively responsible, benefits by those not harmed and increased societal
[Vol. 18:7180 UCLA ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL
reparations, 9/11 dramatically altered America's justice priorities. The 2001
attacks shifted U.S. political consciousness to the "war on terror." Repositioning
America as the victim of hostile aggression, the serious advance on "reparations
was blasted off the political map." 86 Most major political initiatives withered.
C. Third Generation: Litigation
Scholars and advocates shifted from the political to the legal, from legislatures
to courts, remaking reparations theory and practice into a third generation marked
by demands for reparations as legal claims in the courts. Randall Robinson's
controversial book, The Debt, urged the United States to pay reparations as
"restitution to blacks for the damage done."87  His book encouraged African
Americans to seek court-mandated remedies. Scholars and litigators worked to
craft reparations within a formal narrow legal framework as legal claims largely for
compensation.88 While reciting a poignant history of exploitation and suffering,
proponents sought recovery according to traditional tort and contract legal
doctrines. 89 But, as Matsuda and others earlier predicted, courts dismissed these
traditionally framed lawsuits on ordinary procedural grounds, such as lack of
individual standing and statutes of limitations. 90
The third generation's reparations suits also illuminated the "underside of
reparations process"91 - three socio-legal risks that Matsuda and other second
generation scholars predicted would likely be integral to a reparations claiming
process.
Those scholars characterized the first risk as "the distorted legal framing of
reparations claims."92 As revealed by the dismissal of the Farmer-Paelmann class
action suit,93 if reparations lawsuits are narrowly framed as traditional individual
divisiveness).
86 Klein, supra note 84, at 53, 60.
8 ROBINSON, supra note 64, at 9.
" See, e.g., In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (Farmer-
Paellman class action).
' See generally Third Amended Complaint for Violation of Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civil
Code Section 1750 et seq. & Unlawful Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Professions Code Section 17200 et
seq., Farmer-Paellman v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 552 U.S. 941 (2007) (denying writ of
certiorari) (No. 03 Civ. 2644), 2007 WL 5272849 (Farmer-Paellman class action).
' Brophy, supra note 64, at 103 (noting two specific barriers rendered problematic the reparations-as-legal
compensation approach. First, a traditional tort and contract law requires harm to individual plaintiffs
caused by identifiable defendants. This presents a sizable challenge for African American reparations
claimants because attributing wrongdoing to "particular individuals, businesses, or entities is difficult."
Second, legal claimants must overcome traditional threshold procedural barriers, including standing and
statutes of limitations. These barriers enabled judges to dismiss nearly all African American reparations
claims). See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); Katrina
Miriam Wyman, supra note 30, at 158-59 (2008) (questioning whether monetary compensation can
restore" victims of historical injustice when injuries are incommensurable)
" See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 72, at 487-50 1.
92 Id. at 487.
" In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 754 (7th Cir. 2006) (dismissing class action
against slavery-industry companies for plaintiffs' lack of standing and on statute of limitations grounds).
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legal claims, judges are likely to reject reparations suits at the procedural threshold,
generating a distorted public perception that reparations legal claims lack
substantive merit.
Scholars characterized the second emergent risk as the "dilemma of
reparations." 94  By "inflaming old wounds and triggering regressive reactions,"
reparations claims might engender backlash and entrench victim status.95
The third emergent risk related to Matsuda's concern about the possible
commodification of group-based injustice - the "ideology of reparations." 96
Because reparations claims often separate the "haves" from the "have nots," the
reparations claims process itself might exacerbate race and class tensions by
characterizing some groups as more "worthy" of redress than others. 97
Indeed, legal claims for compensation triggered harsh opposition from
segments of the media and the mainstream public as well as legal scholars. 98 Many
objected to paying for wrongs they had not committed and opposed providing
blanket monetary compensation for all African Americans - including those from
non-slave countries and those who have achieved great wealth, like Oprah
Winfrey.99 Others asserted that the 1960s and 1970s Great Society programs had
more than compensated for past injustices and that reparations litigation
enshrined "victimhood." 00
D. Fourth Generation: Reconciliation
In light of the limitations of the third generation litigation strategy,
reparations proponents revitalized and retooled the repair paradigm of the first
and second generations, but this time incorporated social and political initiatives
aimed mainly at broad forms of reconciliation rather than litigation for monetary
9 Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 72, at 494-97.
9 Id. at 494.
96 Id. at 497-50 1.
97 Id. at 516. Scholars maintained that the "underside" called not for abandonment of reparations, but for
"careful strategic framing of debate and action" about reparations to minimize potential harms. Eric K.
Yamamoto, What's Next? Japanese American Redress and African American Reparations, in REDRESS FOR
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ON REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, JIM CROW, AND THEIR
LEGACIES 411, 415 (Michael T. Martin & Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007); see also Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom, supra note 2, at 392-97.
" For instance, Professors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule proffered a restrictive method for
evaluating African American reparations claims. Taxpayers, they argued, "cannot be blamed for slavery or
be said, in any normal sense, to have benefitted from slavery" nor should proponents "assign blame" to the
U.S. government because it is the "institution that destroyed slavery at great cost." Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 738
(2003). See also Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 813-814 (2006) (appearing to
Professor Brophy that by narrowly defining bona dife reparations, all reparations claims were framed as
meritless by Posner and Vermeule).
9 PETER FLAHERTY & JOHN CARLISLE, NAT'L LEGAL & POLICY CTR., THE CASE AGAINST SLAVE
REPARATIONS (2004), available at http://nlpc.org/sites/default/files/Reparationsbook.pdf (describing
reparations claims as a shakedown of the American people).
10 Shelby Steele, Reparations Enshrine Victimhood, Dishonoring Our Ancestors, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at
23.
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compensation.101 The evolving fourth generation's redress discourse now explicitly
embraces reconciliation, or even more broadly, social healing. Reconciliation
entails the healing of peoples' wounds and the mending of tears in the societal
fabric to foster productive, peaceable relations. 102 This vision of repair has
emerged worldwide.o 3 Many established democracies undertaking reconciliation
initiatives emphasize the "individual and societal benefits of story-telling, apologies,
symbolic payments and public education."10 4
Returning in part to the internment redress model, this current fourth
generation of reparations theory coalesced around recognizing and accepting
responsibility for historic injustice, repairing present-day harms linked to past
group-based injustice, and restoring or building productive group relationships.105
Within the fourth generation's renewed repair, rather than mainly
compensatory, paradigm, like Matsuda fifteen years earlier, scholars emphasized
forward-looking reparatory initiatives. 10 6 While backward-looking initiatives seek
to "correct" past injustice by compensating victims for particularized harms,
forward-looking initiatives recognize continuing harms and emphasize improving
lives into the future.107  Three types of proposals emerged from reparations
proponents. First are "social transformation" programs and multicultural "bottom
up" government initiatives to relieve poverty and eliminate barriers of
discrimination. 08  Second are community/institution building programs to
rebuild communities through government investments that improve the
educational and economic opportunities.109 Third are "individual support based
programs," including government trust funds that help finance individuals'
"college tuition, health care coverage, and business." 10
These kinds of reparative measures - now an integral part of larger
reconciliation initiatives - mark the contemporary global political landscape.
10' See Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 45 (2004); Wenger, Radical to Practical, supra note 31; Yamamoto et al., Crossroads, supra note
14, at31.
102 See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
'0 See THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 79.
'0 Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 74, at 20.
'os Lorraine K. Bannai, Introduction: The 25th Anniversary of the United States v. Hirabayashi Coram Nobis
Case: Its Meaning Then and Its Relevance Now, 11 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 1 (2012) (describing the present
relevance of the internment cases and redress); Yamamoto et al., Crossroads, supra note 14, at 31.
'0 BROPHY, PRO & CON, supra note 19, at 9; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the
Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 307 (2003).
107 BROPHY, PRO & CON, supra note 19, at 9 (citing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 as one model for
redress, Professor Brophy envisions reparations as "programs that are justified on the basis of past harm
and that are also designed to ... correct that harm and/or improve the lives of victims into the future').
'o' See id.; see also Burkett, supra note 22.
' Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Macintosh, Redress and the Salience of Economic Justice, F. ON PUB. POL'Y, 1, 4
(2010), http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/vol20lO.no4/archive.vol 2 010.no4/yamamoto.pdf.
"o ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 143
(2004); Burkett, supra note 22, at 101-02; Carlton Waterhouse, Follow the Yellow Brick Road: Perusing the Path
to Constitutionally Permissible Reparations for Slavery and Jim Crow Era Governmental Discrimination, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 163, 198 (2009).
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With roots in the fifteen-year truth and reconciliation process designed to rebuild
South Africa after the fall of apartheid," they range from Colombia's,1 1 2
Peru's 113 and Kenya's 114 structured, government-supported initiatives, to the
United States' and State of Hawai'i's halting commitments to reconciliation with
Native Hawaiians over land and self-governance,' 1 5 to the efforts of the residents of
the South Korean Island of Jeju to engage the South Korean government and the
United States in healing the persisting wounds of the Jeju April 3rd Grand
Massacre inflicted partially during United States' peacetime occupation of South
Korea. 116
By the end of the 2 010s, however, many reconciliation initiatives faced grave
practical obstacles.117  In Canada, for instance, some indigenous Canadians
expressed frustration at the delayed implementation of reconciliation measures
and at the government's partially empty promises.118  In Timor-Leste, political
instability severely slowed the legislatively-mandated, gender-sensitive reconciliation
process. 119 And in New Zealand, the potency of the Waitangi Tribunal's land
". See DESMOND M. TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999); Penelope E. Andrews,
Reparations for Apartheid's Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155, 1171-72 (2004); Eric
K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 49-52 (1997). In 1993 South Africa
legislatively mandated a widely recognized reconciliation project aimed at healing historic wounds and
rebuilding the nation. South Africa established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to
investigate gross violations of human rights, consider amnesty for those who those who confess to political
crimes and recommend both monetary and nonmonetary reparations for victims. The South Africa TRC
progress is now viewed by many as a mixed bag - with the successes of victim storytelling and the
unearthing of truths about the deep injustices of white apartheid and the failures of economic justice for
the mass of black South Africans.
' See Sibylla Brodzinsky, Colombia to Compensate Victims of Armed Conflict: Historic Law to Financially Redress
Up to Four Million Victims of Decades-Long Internal Conflict Including Those of the State, THE GUARDIAN (May
31, 2011, 6:45AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15718695 (describing 2011
Colombia legislation as a part of a broad reconciliation initiative that combines acknowledgment,
punishment, and restitution to redress the damage of state-sponsored violence against its citizens).
". See Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in
Peru's Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 51, 159 (2007).
"14 See Ron Slye, Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW NEWS & FEATURES (Winter
2012-13), http://www.law.seattleu.edu/xl2893.xml (describing Kenya's structured government-supported
Truth and Reconciliation process).
"' See Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii, and to Offer an Apology to Native Hawaiians on Behalf of the United States for the
Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1513 (1993); Derek H. Kauanoe &
Breann S. Nu'uhiwa, We Are Who We Thought We Were: Congress' Authority to Recognize a Native Hawaiian
Policy United by Common Descent, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 117 (2012); D. Kapua Sproat, Wai Through
Kandswai: Water for Hawaii's Streams andJustice for Hawaiian Communities, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 127 (2012).
"16 See Tae-Ung Baik, Social Healing Through Justice: Jeju 4.3 Case, 2 WORLD ENV. & ISL. STUD. 59 (2012);
Eric K. Yamamoto, Sara Lee & Yea Jin Lee, The United States' Role in the Korea Jeju April 3rd Tragedy and Its
Responsibility for Social Healing Through Justice, 2 WORLD ENV. & ISL. STUD. 49 (2012).
' See generally THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES (Will Kymlicka &
Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) (hereinafter THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATIONI.
"' See INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, TRUTH HEALING
RECONCILIATION (2008), available at http://www.trc-cvr.ca/pdfs/20080818eng/pdf (describing a
commission that seeks to guide Canadian natives "in a process of truth, healing and reconciliation that will
lead to renewed relations" with the Canadian government).
"9 See Yamamoto et al. Crossroads, supra note 14, at 6 n.20.
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determinations in favor of the Maori people was undermined by the government's
politically-based delays. 120  Similar practical obstacles plagued reconciliation
initiatives across the globe, in countries like Nepal, Sierra Leone, Chile, Sri Lanka,
and Bosnia. 121
Reconciliation's limitations may well lie in its illusive meaning and shifting
political underpinnings. The language of reconciliation alone offers no firm
guidance to even well-meaning policymakers and also allows ill-intentioned
politicians to disguise continuing power abuses behind a peaceable facade.
Matsuda earlier cautioned about this danger in assessing the ways that reparations
might be distorted both by conventional legal analysis and by political
opposition.12 2 The idea of reconciliation, while powerful, did not itself provide a
detailed, grounded analytical framework to guide and assess real-life reparatory
initiatives.
E. Beyond the Fourth Generation: Social Healing
Faced with these challenges in theory, on the ground reparations initiatives are
facing a bumpy, though still passable, road towards justice. Fourth generation
theorists are continuing to recast the repair approach to historic injustice,
searching for new language within a conceptually sound and practically workable
framework. Part of that effort today is the resurfacing of Matsuda's fundamental
insights from Looking to the Bottom.
To address the repair paradigm's salutary aspects and uncertainties, redress
scholars and advocates are endeavoring to discern analytically and practically when
social healing efforts are truly productive for individuals and society and when they
are not.123 The aim is to capture concepts, expressed in a "common language,"
that serve both as a "strategic guide" for new or on-going initiatives and as a "tool
120 See generally Joe Williams, Truth, Reconciliation and the Class of Cultures in the Waitangi Tribunal, AusTL. &
N.Z. L. & HIST. E-J. (2005) (describing politically-induced delays in process of government approval of
tribunal awards).
121 See, e.g., Chowa Choo, Serbs Sony for Srebrenica Massacre, THE EPOCH TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/32607/ (noting that for social healing, Serbian
recognition of its crimes against Bosinians during the Bosnia-Herzegovina wars is "key for reconciliation in
the Balkan region"); Lansana Fofana, Sierra Leone: No Easy Road to Reconciliation, INTER PRESS SERVICE
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.aspidnews=50794; Japan to Assist Sri
Lanka Police in Reconciliation Efforts, COLOMBO PAGE (Mar. 29, 2010, 11:45 AM),
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_10/Marl269843343CH.html (discussing the "ethnic differences
that are hindering reconciliation"); Mac Margolis, The Art of Darkness: In Latin America, Honoring Victims of
the Dirty Wars Can Be a Political Act, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 1, 2010, 8:00PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/id/235684.
122 See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 393-97.
i.. See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 79, at 455
(identifying specific reparatory goals of "recognition, civic trust, and social solidarity"); SHERRILYN A. IFILL,
ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 133 (2007) (urging scholars and advocates to assess reconciliation efforts in light of their capacity
to create a new community that can hear and acknowledge the stories of both victims and perpetrators, of
beneficiaries and bystanders).
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of assessment" for actions already taken.124
As anticipated by Matsuda's infusion of conceptual notes beyond law's normal
register - she called it "traneing," after Coltrane's jazz riffs1 25 - multidisciplinary
scholarship on reconciliation offers insights into the kind of justice that heals
group-based wounds. For instance, Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, the editors
of The Politics of Reconciliation, explore the "real-world intermingling" of
reconciliation efforts and identity politics.126 Scholars who engage social science,
most notably in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation, analyze social group
healing in light of the social psychological processes. 127 Drawing from Christian
theology, Roy Brooks suggests that the "key to racial reconciliation" is atonement
and forgiveness. 128 Rebecca Tsosie infuses indigenous peoples' cultural practices
and values to "engage the spirit of racial healing." l29 Eric Yamamoto and Brian
Macintosh draw upon the economic capability theories of Amartya Sen and
Martha Nussbaum to highlight the "salience of economic justice" to redress
initiatives. 130
Yamamoto coalesces these and other approaches and offers a multidisciplinary
four-dimensional framework to guide and assess reparatory initiatives. 13 1  This
124 See Yamamoto et al., Crossroads, supra note 14, at 38 (describing the search for "common language," a
"strategic guide" and "a tool of assessment"); see also Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara D. Ayabe, Courts in the "Age
of Reconciliation": Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. HCDCH, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 503 (2011).
125 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 388.
126 THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION, supra note 117, at 7 (describing the interaction of academic
theorizing with on-the-ground reparations movements).
" THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION (Arie Nadler et al. eds., 2008)
(addressing varying processes of social group healing from the harms of mass trauma).
128 BROOKS, supra note 110, at 43.
129 Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing Within Critical Race Theory: An Exercise in
Transformative Thought, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 21, 22 (2005) (concerning Native Hawailans and the
continuing harms of colonization, assessing "what it means to 'heal' injustice [that] is embedded in society
at the level of both structure and consciousness").
13o Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Macintosh, Redress and the Salience of Economic Justice, F. ON PUB. POL'Y,
(2010), http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/vol2010.no4/archive.vol2010.no4/yamamoto.pdf (employing
Sen and Nussbaum's capacity-building theories as foundation for economic justice as an integral
component of redress and assessing impact on reconciliation of governmental failure to build economic
capacity for those injured by historic injustice). See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female
Human Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 62
(Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathon Glover eds., 1996); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 6
(1999). See generally EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE,
GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2005).
131 Drawing insights from social psychology, prophetic theology, political theory, law, economics and
indigenous healing practices, Social Healing Through Justice emerges from four commonalities among these
diverse disciplines. The first commonality is recognition that "all are members of the polity, and injury to
one harms the entire community, and therefore healing the injured is the responsibility of all." The
second is that genuine healing requires mutual engagement and simultaneous repair on both the individual
and collective level. Participation "must be widespread, and all must see a benefit." The third is that for
redress to be meaningful, communities must see "material change" in socio-economic conditions. The
fourth distills the other commonalities into the analytical framework for guiding and assessing reparatory
initiatives on the ground, the "Four Rs" of Social Healing Through Justice (recognition, responsibility,
reconstruction, and reparation). Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 74, at 32-33. See also
ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES
(1st. ed. 2000) (economics and psychology); BROOKS, supra note 110 (Christianity); DONALD W. SHRIVER,
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framework emphasizes a kind of justice that aims to heal psychological wounds
and repair the material damage of historical injustice. Rather than a one-time
payment of often symbolic monetary compensation as the main goal, a framework
of social healing through justice focuses "on ways to 'repair' the deep harms to society
(divisions, guilt, shame, lack of moral standing) by healing the continuing
[economic and psychological) wounds of [people suffering group-based]
injustice."
The heart of this kind of social healing by doing justice is illuminated in part by
emerging international human rights norms of reparative justice. 133 In 2005, the
United Nations Human Rights Commission approved the "Basic Principles . . .
[on] Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights Law."' 34 Those
principles specify forward-looking forms of reparatory justice for group-based
human rights violations, including restitution of land and personal property,
compensation for specific losses, rehabilitation of shattered communities, and
institutional reforms to guarantee non-repetition of abuses. 135
Although most international human rights remain unenforceable in courts of
law, as aspirational norms, they now "affect how both policy makers and ordinary
citizens think about the state's interest" in reparations for past or continuing
government-sponsored injustice.136  Thus, human rights norms affect notions of
social healing by "influencing modes of thought . .. [and becoming] a constitutive
part of culture, shaping and determining social relations and providing 'a
distinctive manner of imagining' what is morally right and just."137
For these reasons, governments and advocacy groups throughout the world are
"increasingly embracing reparations for historic harms inflicted by governments
JR., AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS 9 (1995); NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A
SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION (1991).
..2 Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 74, at 30. See also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board
of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (drawing from Professor
Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis that dominant groups tend to recognize rights of vulnerable
groups only when doing so benefits their larger interests for Social Justice Through Healing).
" See Sproat, supra note 115.
" BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF
GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, C.H.R. Res. 2005/35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.11
(Apr. 19, 2005). See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 271 A (Ill), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3 d Sess., art. 4, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), at 52, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23,
1976); American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, Ninth International
Conference of American States (May 2, 1948); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46/Annex (Dec. 10, 1984); Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, art. 11, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007);
"' See Dinah Shelton, The United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents, in
OUT OF ASHES: REPARATIONS FOR VICnMs OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
11 (Koen De Feyter et al. eds., 2005).
"' Paul Shiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2006). See
also Thomas Antkowiak, Remedy Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and Beyond 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351, 357 (2008).
"' See Yamamoto et al. Crossroads, supra note 14, at 57 (quoting Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits
of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1281 (2006).
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and businesses as a lynchpin for legitimizing present-day democratic
governance." More than ever, both established and transitioning democracies
perceive a larger self-interest in acknowledging responsibility for historic group-
based injustices and repairing persisting damage. 139
As the fourth generation of reparations scholarship and practice continues to
evolve, and as reconciliation initiatives (incorporating reparations components)
populate the global landscape, international human rights norms increasingly
influence the tenor of social healing. Thus, Matsuda's earlier creative insights into
expansive forward-looking remedies presaged a broadly intertwined domestic law
and human rights approach to reparative justice.140
This evolving approach to reparations as a critical legalism emerged recently
from an unexpected source - the British High Court in London.
IV. HISTORIC 2011-2012 BRITISH HIGH COURT RULINGS ON MAU
MAU REPARATIONS CLAIMS: A CASE STUDY OF REPARATIONS AS
CRITICAL LEGALISM
In 2011 and 2012, Britain's High Court placed its imprimatur on the Mau
Mau reparations lawsuit for British Government-related atrocities in colonial
Kenya decades ago. 141 By contrast, United States courts terminated reparations
suits by World War II Japanese American internees, 142 African Americans for
slavery-related harms,143 and African American victims of the 1921 Tulsa Race
138 See id. at 64; Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Why Reparations to African American Descendants in the United States Are
Essential to Democracy, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 633 (2011).
"' See Yamamoto et al., Crossroads, supra note 14, at 72-73.
140 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and
Restorative Justice, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279 (2011). With this broader human rights vision, justice-oriented
reparations supporters now acknowledge that until recently reparations advocacy itself at times replicated a
particular kind of injustice. It reflected a gender bias, discounting unique systemic harms to women). See
also Colleen Duggan & Adila Abusharaf, Reparation of Sexual Violence in Democratic Transitions: The Search for
Gender Justice, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 79, at 623 (calling for gender-sensitive
redress); Eric K. Yamamoto & Michele Park Sonen, Redress Bias?, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE
LAW 244 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (identifying gender and race-gender biases in
past redress initiatives and employing implicit bias theories as explanations). Professor Matsuda's
contributions to feminist legal theory about women's autonomy over their bodies, although not directly
addressing gender-sensitive reparations, helped pry open this new door to reparatory justice. See generally
MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW
(1996).
141 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120121 EWHC (QB) 2678 (Eng.); Mutua v. Ndiku Mutua
and Others v. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [20111 EWHC (QB) 1913 [141 (Eng.).
41 See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (dismissing in part a class action damage suit
by former internees on statute of limitations grounds). See generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET
CHON, CAROL IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK WU, RACE RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2d ed. 2013) (describing the "internment" cases and redress).
113 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2006) (dismissing class action
against slavery-industry companies for plaintiffs' lack of standing and on statute of limitations grounds);
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cit. 1995) (dismissing slavery reparations claims at outset of
litigation).
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Riot mayhem144 for failure to plead bona fide legal claims or because the statute of
limitations expired. The High Court in Mutua, et al. v. Foreign and Commonwealth
Offices45 might have similarly ended the Mau Mau's controversial claim at the
threshold, well before further information discovery and certainly before an
embarrassing public trial. But it chose to do the opposite.
In startling rulings for what is usually deemed to be a non-adventurous
tribunal, the High Court denied the defendant Government's motion to
dismiss.1 46 It determined that the Mau Mau claimants marshaled enough
preliminary evidence of group-based torture and abuse linked to the British
Government to state a bona fide legal claim under English common law, and more
generally according to international human rights norms, to overcome the statute
of limitations time-bar.' 47 Their claim will now proceed to a formal public trial.
The High Court embarked on a juridical road less traveled. It acknowledged
the colonial setting, group-based harms, and forward-looking human rights norms
of reparatory justice. With an apparent eye on social healing in addition to
compensation, it at least implicitly embraced reparations as a critical legalism, as
something far more than a "standard legal judgment."' 48  Indeed, Matsuda's
scholarship on reparations elucidates a coherent framework by which to analyze
the High Court's decisions.
As summarized below, although cast in formal legal language, the High
Court's rulings were anything but a "standard legal judgment."' 4 9 And regardless
of ultimate formal outcome, by altering public perceptions, the rulings may well
have significantly advanced prospects for long-delayed justice for the Mau Mau.
A. Background of the Case
As part of a multi-dimensional reparatory justice campaign, 50 five elderly
Kenyans - Paulo Muoka Nzili, Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Ndiku Mutwiwa Mutua,
Susan Ngondi, and Jane Muthoni Mara - filed a reparation lawsuit against the
British government in the British High Court in London for torture during the
Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the 1950s.15 ' Filed in 2009, the suit held a mirror
up to the British Government's brutal colonial past' 52 and asked England and its
" Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004) (dismissing class action on statute of
limitations grounds).
"4 120121 EWHC (QB) 2678 (Eng.).
'" Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [20111 EWHC (QB) 1913,11591 (Eng.).
1' Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120121 EWHC (QB) 2678,11581 (Eng.).
14 See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 397-99.
149 See id.
15o Support the Mau Mau Reparations Campaign, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, Mar. 5, 2009,
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/54582.
"' Mutua v. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [20121 EWHC (QB) 2678, 181 (Eng.).
15 Carina Ray, The Empire's Ghost Returns, NEW AFRICAN 18 (Aug.-Sept. 2009), available at
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url-ver=Z39.88-2004&res-dat-xri:bsc:&
rft dat=xri:bsc:ft:iibp:00373880; see also Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120111 EWHC (QB)
1913,11561 (Eng.); Nation Reporter, Mau Mau to Sue UK for Compensation, DAILY NATION (May 10, 2009,
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populace to acknowledge gross human rights abuses and heal the persisting
wounds of systemic torture.
The Mau Mau rebellion began as an indigenous (primarily Kikuyu) anti-
colonial movement for Kenyan independence from 60 years of British colonial
rule and for recovery of native lands.154  Displacing Kenya's indigenous peoples,
British settlers capitalized on Kenya's vast arable lands.155  The Mau Mau
movement emerged from broiling dissatisfaction with land losses, social inequality,
and deteriorating indigenous culture and work and housing opportunities. Kenyan
independence fighters and a multitude of supporters backed the freedom
movement - one of many in Africa at the time. 1
The British government moved quickly to suppress the rebellion. It declared a
state of emergency and endorsed mass detention, which often began with village
burnings.157 Security forces ordered families, including many indigenous Kikuyu,
into makeshift camps158 where guards whipped workers, 15' beat and castrated
males, and tortured and raped women into sexual submission.160 The rebellion
and the British government's reaction tore communities apart.
The British government outlawed any mention of the atrocities and branded
the Mau Mau as terrorists instead of freedom fighters. 162 The long-standing ban
prevented the Mau Mau from fully telling their story and engaging in organized
5:32 PM), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/595996/-/u67str/-/index.html; Kharunya Paramaguru,
Justice for the Mau Mau: Court Case in the U.K. Sheds Light on Grim Colonial Past, TIME WORLD (Oct. 10,
2012), http://world.time.com/2012/10/10/justice-for-the-maumau-court-case-in-the-u-k-sheds-lighton-
grim-colonial-past.
" Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120111 EWHC (QB) 1913, 181, 191,113], [27] (Eng.).
15 Id. at 1411, [42].
" DAVID CAVALERI, THE LAW OF WAR: CAN 20TH-CENTURY STANDARDS APPLY TO THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERRORISM? 57 (2005), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/csi_cavalerilaw.pdf
(noting that historically, the Kikuyu were one of over thirty indigenous Kenyan groups that comprised a
third of the Kenyan population and occupied "the most fertile land in the Kenyan highlands" that came
under the ownership of less than 30,000 Europeans).
I56 Id. at 58.
1' Id.
55 Id. at 65.
15 CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN'S GULAG IN KENYA 247
(Ist ed. 2005).
0 Simon Rutho, one of the few male survivors of the Nyeri District's Gatung'ang'a village, recounts the
sexual violence:
There was a headman . . . from Kiamarigal, ... a very cruel man. Whenever that headman
desired a woman, and she refused him, he would take a beer bottle, then order an askari
Isolider] to hold one of the woman's legs, and another to hold the other, wide apart. Then he
would insert the bottle into the woman's private parts and punch it up to the stomach. Many
women died after having been treated that way.
Id. at 245.
6I DAVID ANDERSON, HISTORIES OF THE HANGED: THE DIRTY WAR IN KENYA AND THE END OF EMPIRE
4 (1st ed. 2005) (stating that the British Government enforced a deliberate policy to divide African
communities. "Loyalists" Keyans supported the government and opposed the Mau Mau).
162 Lift Mau Mau Ban Plea, THE INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, Aug. 13, 2000, at 4; Hugh Macleod, Kenya
Scraps Law Against Mau Mau Rebels, THE INDEP., Sept. 1, 2003, at 10.
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reparative justice activity.163 Their characterization as terrorists legally shielded the
British government from reparation claims because under the Geneva
Convention, governments were not liable for the harsh treatment of prisoners
engaged in terrorism.164  Post-independence Kenyan leadership maintained the
ban on speech related to the Mau Mau rebellion and buried the memory of the
Mau Mau ostensibly to promote national unity. 65 Then-President Jomo Kenyatta
assured European settler-farmers of their safety by cementing Kikuyu
subordination,166 characterizing Mau Mau as "a disease which had been
eradicated, and must never be remembered again." 167 Later Kenyan leadership
also suppressed the memory of Mau Mau in history books and independence
celebrations. 168
However, in 2002, Kenyans employed "ballot power" to uproot corrupt
leadership and elect Mwai Kibaki, a Gikuyu from the Mau Mau heartland of
Nyeri.169 Kibaki, praised as "the people's choice,170 quickly and boldly removed
the 56-year-old ban on the Mau Mau. 7 ' This facilitated open discussions about
the atrocities and the creation of the Mau Mau War Veterans' Association.172 The
Veterans' Association, with government support, demanded an accurate written
history of the rebellion before aging elders passed on.
B. Reparative Justice Movement
At the same time, the Republic of Kenya created a Task Force on the
Establishment of a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission to determine
the necessity of a formal truth commission investigation. 73  The Kenyan
government desired to be perceived as a human rights adherent and thereby
enhance its legitimacy as an emerging democracy.174  The Task Force listened to
16 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120121 EWHC (QB) 2678, [331 (Eng.) ("Any act that could
be considered to be 'organising or taking part in any activity for or on behalf of' a proscribed organisation
such as Mau Mau was punishable with up to 14 years imprisonment, a substantial fine or both").
6 Macleod, supra note 161.
6 Lotte Hughes, "Truth Be Told": Some Problems with Historical Revisionism in Kenya, 70 AFR. STUD. 182, 187
(2011); Ray, supra note 152, at 18.
'" James Ogude, The Truth of the Nation & The Changing Image of Mau Mau in Kenya Literature, in THE MAU
MAU & NATIONHOOD: ARMS, AUTHORITY & NARRATION 270 (E.S. Atieno Odhiambo & John Lonsdale
eds., 2003); Hughes, supra note 167, at 187 (stating that President Jomo Kenyatta sought to "cement
Kikuyu sub-nationalism" and reassure protections of European farmers).
67 Hughes, supra note 165, at 185; Andrew Novak, Constitutional Reform and the Abolition of the Mandatory
Death Penalty in Kenya, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 285, 328-29 (2012).
' Ogude, supra note 166, at 270.
1" Hughes, supra note 165, at 185; Ray, supra note 152, at 18; Daniel Teng'o, Kenyan Press Cheers Kibaki,
WORLDPRESS.ORG, (Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.worldpress.org/print-article.cfm?article-id=1022.
170 Hughes, supra note 165, at 185.
171 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [2012] EWHC (QB) 2678, [331 (Eng.) (Mau Mau ban
removed in 2002/3).
7n Paramaguru, supra note 152.
173 Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of A Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 15 (2004).
'7 Id.
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first-hand accounts of the suffering of Kenyans during the colonial era.17 5
However, it recommended that a formal Truth Commission focus only on the
post-colonial period of 1963-2002.16
The Mau Mau Veterans' Association rejected the Task Force's
recommendation for a sharply limited inquiry. It appealed to the Kenya Human
Rights Commission and a United Kingdom law firm and formed a Mau Mau
reparations legal team.177 Based on historians' investigations, the Human
Rights Commission in 2006 launched a Mau Mau Reparations Campaign in
Kenya and Britain. 179 The campaign set forth clear objectives: educate the local
and global communities about the group-based atrocities against the Mau Mau and
the need for redress; energize an incipient redress movement and achieve
reparations for the Mau Mau torture survivors; trigger the British government's
acceptance of responsibility; and engender social healing for the future by
"tilmplant[ing] the tools for comprehensive transitional justice in Kenya."1 8 0 The
British Government refused to engage.
C. Mutua, et al. v. Foreign and Commonwealth Office
So in 2009, the Mau Mau claimants sued the British government. 182 In Mutua
v. Foreign and Commonewealth Office, they asserted tort claims for damages under
English law for assault, battery, and negligence. 183  They maintained that the
British government authorized and jointly designed the system of torture against
them and also negligently failed to prevent the torture, beatings, and rape by
Kenyan governmental actors.' 84 In light of those transgressions, the Mau Mau
claimants asserted a right to meaningful redress emanating from both domestic
common law and international law. 185
1s Id. at 18.
176 Id. at 46-47 (noting that extending the Truth Commission investigation to include colonial human
rights violations "would be an impossibly expensive, laboriously prohibitive, and practically unmanageable
exercise"). The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya adopted the Task Force's
recommendation and only "investigateldi the gross human rights violations and other historical injustices
in Kenya between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008," excluding the Mau Mau atrocities. About
TJRC, THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF KENYA,
http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.phpoption=comcontent&view-article&id=93&temid=118 (last visited
Mar. 14, 2013).
"' Corydon Ireland, Justice for Kenya's Mau Mau, HARv. GAZETTE, Sept. 1, 2011,
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2011/09/justice-for-kenyae2%80%99s-mau-mau/; see also Leigh
Brownhill, Mau Mau Demand Reparations from Britain for Colonial Crimes, 20 CAPITALISM NATURE
SOCIALISM 102 (2009); Leigh Day Launches Mau Mau Claim, LEIGH DAY (May 11, 2009),
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2009/May2009/Leigh-Day-launchesMau-Mau-claim.
"7 See Paramaguru, supra note 152; Ray, supra note 152, at 18.
' Brownhill, supra note 177.
" Support the Mau Mau Reparations Campaign, supra note 150.
1'1 Id.
1'2 Leigh Day Launches Mau Mau Claim, supra note 177.
183 [2011] EWHC (QB) 1913, 11] (Eng.).
1 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [2012] EWHC (QB) 2678, 1351 (Eng.).
' The High Court noted that the claimants' submission cited human rights principles that require a
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1. British Government's Threshold Motion to Dismiss
The defendant, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office ("FCO")
representing the British Government, moved to dismiss the reparations claim. 186
The motion to dismiss (or in the alternative for summary judgment) under British
law is a threshold motion decided early in the case to determine whether enough
evidence exists to allow the litigation to proceed through the discovery stage and to
trial.187  Especially when a case involves events that occurred many years earlier
and particularly when the Government is a targeted defendant facing a
controversial charge, courts are inclined to grant the motion and end the case well
before it exposes the Government at trial to both liability and embarrassment. '88
An early dismissal of Mutua not only would have ended the case, it would have
publicly signaled government absolution - the Mau Mau's reparations claim so
lacked merit that it was not substantial enough to get to trial. Indeed, in moving
to dismiss at the threshold, the British Government asserted exactly that: it denied
legal responsibility for torture that may have been committed by the Colonial
Government in Kenya (which ceased to exist since 1963) and further denied that
the British Government was in any way directly involved in torture. 189
The Mau Mau claimants traveled 4,000 miles to oppose the Government's
motion to dismiss in the High Court in London. Plaintiffs Mutua and Nzili
presented evidence that British perpetrators castrated them and that British
detention officials manacled Nyingi for two years and beat him unconscious. 190
They also attested to horrific sexual violence. 191  The Mau Mau claimants
additionally presented academic historians' "sizable documentary base" detailing
grave abuses and the colonial system of authority and control.t 2 The claimants
asserted that common law and public international law principles passed liabilities
of the old Colonial Government to the British Government upon
independence. 193 Moreover, the Mau Mau litigants asserted that the British
Government should be held directly liable because its Army and Colonial Office
instigated and procured a system of horrific abuse in violation of broadly accepted
international law precepts.1 94 Documents showed that in July 1957, the British
nation's legal system to ensure that torture victims "obtain redress," including "adequate compensation"
and "as full rehabilitation as possible." Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120111 EWHC (QB)
1913, 11561 (Eng.) (citing U.N. Charter art. 73; United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, art. 14, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)).
116 Id. at 121.
17 Id. at 131.
'8 See supra notes 135-37 (noting American courts threshold dismissals of reparations lawsuits).
189 Summary of Judgment at 5, Mutua, 120111 E.W.H.C. 1913 (Q.B.) (No. HQ09XO2666).
'" Ian Cobain & Peter Walker, Secret Memo Gave Guidelines on Abuse of Mau Mau in 1950s, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 11, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/11/mau-mau-high-court-foreign-
office-documents.
191 Id.
192 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [20111 EWHC (QB) 1913,1331 (Eng.).
.. Id. at 151.
194 Id. at 1121.
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government authorized a policy encouraging the gross abuse of detainees. 195
2. High Court Rulings: A Group-Based Notion of Perpetrator, Opening the
Door to British Government's Liability, and Extending the Statute of
Limitations
After careful review, 196 the British High Court issued a historic ruling in July
2011.197 Instead of granting the motion to dismiss, Judge McCombe of the High
Court determined that the Mau Mau claimants presented an "arguable" claim
against the British Government on four of the five asserted legal grounds.198
Conflicting evidence made it impossible to rule out the strong inference that
British General Erskine, the colonial Commander-in-Chief, and those under his
command, "instigat[ed] or procur[ed]" the system of torture of detainees1 99
pursuant to "a common design" that benefitted both the British Government and
its colonial arm in Kenya. 200
In so ruling, the High Court appeared to reject the Government's narrow
construction of "perpetrator." The Government had argued that the "UK
government" was not liable for the "assaults for which only the actual perpetrators
and their employers, the Kenyan government were liable." 20 1 Separate from the
possibility of vicarious liability which the Court recognized in its October 2012
ruling,202 the Court employed a broad notion of fault and causation. Consistent
with Matsuda's expanded liberal legal notion of a group-based perpetrator, it
rejected the Government's individualized notion of fault because "the claimants
would [then] have to identify individuals who they could say procured the
commission of the torts," which would be difficult long after the events. 203
Rather, the Court construed perpetration not only as individual acts by individual
actors, but also as organizational participation in a "common design to commit
torture." 204
To underscore this group-based notion of perpetrator in this colonial torture
setting and to focus on the human rights harms suffered by those at the bottom,
the High Court quoted from a 1954 Kenyan court opinion finding a "system of
torture." 205  Without identifying individual perpetrators, that opinion cited to
195 Id.
196 Id. at 145].
19 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120111 EWHC (QB) 1913 (Eng.).
" Id. at 158].
' Id. at [1251. A historian testified that Commander-in-Chief Erskine and his successor knew about the
grave abuses and, despite a statement to the contrary, supported the atrocities by "playling 1] central rolels]
... [in] screening, interrogations, villagisation and detention policies . . ." Id. at 1124-25].
20 Id. at 11251.
" Id. at 11141.
202 Id. at 11151.
23 Id. at It 181.
z Id. at 11161.
20 Id. at I1261.
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"common [torture] practice" by "screening teams" 206 and observed that "[what
legal powers of detention these teams have or under whose authority they act we
do not know."207  Given the emergency regulations authorizing detentions,
however, that court observed that "whatever the authority responsible, it is difficult
to believe that these teams could continue to use methods of unlawful violence
without the knowledge and condonation of the [organizational] authority." 208
And it concluded that the government organization would be held responsible
because "[sluch methods are the negation of the rule of law which it is the duty of
courts to uphold."2 09
The Mau Mau litigants also bolstered their reparation claim by asserting the
British government's "joint liability" for assaults after July 1957.210 Secret
telegrams and documents between the governor of the colony and the British
Secretary of State in London from July 1957 appeared to expressly authorize
detainees' torture.211  Rather than respond to the documents' content, the
defendant FCO contended that the communications amounted to the British
Secretary of State's mere approval of a proposed action by the colonial government
and therefore did not reflect independent action by the British government, thus
shielding it from liability.2 12 Indeed, an earlier English case, R (Quark Fishing Ltd)
v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, had announced a broad
doctrine clearly designed to prevent claims against the colonial power for acts of
the local colonial government installed and overseen by the colonizer. 213 However,
Judge McCombe noted legal ambiguity about precisely what circumstances
triggered the liability shield.2 14 In view of this "uncertainty," he opted to narrowly
construe the Quark rule. 215  By doing so, he removed the threshold shield to
British Government accountability, finding preliminarily that "the Secretary of
State acted as one of Her Majesty's Ministers in the United Kingdom." 216
The final leg of the Mau Mau's reparation claim, the Government's negligence
in failing to stop the abuses, also survived the defendant's motion to dismiss.2 17
Generally, under English common law, mere omissions do not impose liability.218
Moreover, Judge McCombe acknowledged that "courts have expressed reluctance
206 ELKINS, supra note 159, at 63 (according to Caroline Elkins, one of Plaintiffs expert historians, British
security forces, European settlers, and the Kenyan police force, collectively formed screening teams that
"spearheaded a campaign to interrogate anyone suspected of Mau Mau involvement" - "no Kikuya-man,
woman, child-was safe from the screening teams. Every Kikuya was a suspect").
22. Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [20111 EWHC (QB) 1913, (1261 (Eng.).
208 Id.
209
21o Id. at 11291.
211 Id. at 11031.
212 See id. at [1051 (effectively although not expressly arguing for a shield from liability).
213 Id. at 150-561.
214 Id. at 11091
2us1Id. atl09-ll]
11 ld. at [1111.
"' Id. at 11591.
218 Id. at 11401.
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to impose a duty in areas where public policy issues, in the sense of political
judgments, arise," noting that normally courts are "ill-equipped and ill-suited to
assess [matters of policy]." 21 9 But Judge McCombe cited a recognized opening for
judicial intervention and creativity: in "exceptional cases," the court will "accept
that the interests of justice justify" an extension of governmental accountability for
passive negligence.220
Employing the context-dependent test of "interests of justice," Judge
McCombe ruled that "judicial policy might positively demand the existence of a
duty of care [rule]" in this "exceptional case." 221  He explained that "[tihe time
must come when standing by and doing nothing, by those with authority and
ability to stop the abuse, becomes a positive policy to continue it.t222
In similar fashion Judge McCombe disposed of the British Government's
second procedural maneuver aimed at evading a decision on the substantive merits
- the statute of limitations.22 3 Because the Mau Mau sustained initial injuries over
50 years ago, the Government argued that the Limitations Act barred their
personal injury filing in 2009.224 For contextual reasons similar to those just
described, however, and consistent with Matsuda's notion of an expansive statute
of limitations for historic group-based injustice with persisting harms, Judge
McCombe rejected the British Government's time-bar argument. In late 2012,
after full briefing and factual presentations, the High Court determined that the
limitations period had not expired.225  In light of the legal ban on the very
existence of the Mau Mau until 2003 (and indirectly on even mention of the
British government's suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion), in light of the
extreme emotional barriers to claimants' acknowledgment of their suffering
(surviving women could not speak of their sexual torture to their later
husbands),226 and in light of the British government's possibly inadvertent
misplacement of key documents bearing on liability (located after the litigation
29 Id. at 11511 (quoting Barrett v. Enfield LBC, 119891 3 W.L.R. 83 (Eng.)). This is akin to the American
law doctrine of "political question" where courts refuse to rule where important political policies issues are
at stake.
Z20 Id. at [1521 (quoting Reeman v. Dept. of Transp., [19971 PNLR 618, 625 (Eng.)).
221 Id. at [1531.
222 Id. at 11441.
223 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [20121 EWHC (QB) 2678,11581 (Eng.).
224 Limitations Act (1980), c. 58 § 11(4) (Eng.). The 1980 Limitations Act requires that personal injury
claims be filed within "three years from (a)the date on which the cause of action accrued; or (b) the date of
knowledge (if later) of the person injured."
225 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [20121 EWHC (QB) 2678, 11601 (Eng.). Justice McCombe
acknowledged "the present case is not quite like any other" decided under section 33 of the Limitation Act.
Id. at 1101. Therefore, case law "offeris] only limited assistance ... on overarching principles." Id.
226 Id. at [351 ("ITIhe claimants point to the seriously humiliating (and partly sexual) torture and other ill-
treatment to which each was subjected. They say that this had a psychologically debilitating effect upon
their ability to speak openly, or in some cases even privately, about what had happened to them. By way of
example, Mrs Mara has still not felt able to discuss these matters with her husband."). Cf. Devika Hovell,
The Gulf Between Tortious and Torturous, II J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 65 (2013) (critiquing Judge McCombe's
reliance on tort law rather than human rights law on torture, including non-resort to the European
Convention on Human Rights to decide statute of limitations issue).
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commenced),227 the Court declined to terminate the case on time-bar procedural
grounds and instead ordered the Mau Mau reparative justice claim to full public
trial.22
D. Looking Forward
In his opinion, Judge McCombe underscored the significance of reclamation
of a nation's "honour" and the legitimacy of its legal system.22 9 He observed that
the "use of torture is dishonorable. It corrupts and degrades the state [and] . . . the
legal system which accepts it."230 Revealing the heart of his thinking about
"symbolic significance," he quoted at length a case that poignantly noted the
evolving international "revulsion" with torture in concluding "the rejection of
torture by the common law has a special iconic importance as the touchstone of a
humane and civilised legal system." 23 1 In doing so, Judge McCombe presented
what Matsuda termed the "symbolic significance" of the Mau Mau campaign for
reparations.
Through these statements, Judge McCombe endeavored to legitimate his
technically explained refusal to summarily dismiss the Mau Mau's claims. His
statements highlighted the importance of judicial intervention "in the interests of
justice," even though traditional doctrines had to be flexibly construed and "public
policy issues, in the sense of political judgments" were implicated.232 The High
Court conceptualized the Mau Mau's claim as far different from an ordinary
common law personal injury suit, and alluded to the colonial context of the claims
and the larger interests of those "at the bottom," as well as the British
government's stake in just adjudication. In doing so, the High Court's rulings
indeed reflected far more than the standard legal judgment.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: REPARATIONS (AND SOCIAL HEALING
THROUGH JUSTICE) AS CRITICAL LEGALISMS
In broadly construing "perpetrator," in creatively narrowing the Quark rule
and rejecting the Government's negligence-immunity argument, in stretching the
limitations period for initiating suit, in underscoring the Government's temporary
loss of key documents and the claimants' continuing suffering, and in thereby
expanding potential government accountability for historic transgressions in the
"interests of justice," Judge McCombe implicitly embraced both an expanded
liberal legal view of the Mau Mau's claim and what Matsuda terms "reparations as
a critical legalism."
227 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120111 EWHC (QB) 1913, 1321 (Eng.); Cobain & Walker,
supra note 190.
228 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 120121 EWHC (QB) 2678,11601 (Eng.).
229 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 12011] EWHC (QB) 1913, 11541 (Eng.);
230 Id. at 1153].
232 Id.
232 See sup'ra notes 189-96.
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The 2011 and 2012 rulings signaled the High Court's assessment about the
importance of publically ventilating the entire Mau Mau rebellion story at trial - it
noted media publicity - and the significance of determining the British
Government's accountability for historic human rights abuses during the waning
days of its colonial empire. By acknowledging the "exceptional" nature of the
claims and the colonial context, by invoking the "interests of justice," the Court
underscored evolving social healing concerns characterized by evolving fourth
generation reparations theory: the acknowledgment of historical wrongs (based
upon the voices of those oppressed and the government's own files), the
recognition of continuing individual and group-based injuries, and a commitment
to appropriate redress (which implicates broad relief, including raising the
standard of living, promoting cultural survival and political participation and
fostering a "new [public] consciousness"23 3) - all while "looking always to victims
for guidance" 234 and recognizing a national interest in reestablishing or enhancing
legitimacy as a democracy committed to human rights.235
Even though a public trial or an unlikely public settlement is yet to come, and
although serious reparations claims often invoke potent backlash and the risk of
commodification, 236 the High Court's rulings move the Mau Mau's claim down a
potential path toward some fashion of social healing, both for the Mau Mau as a
group and British society as a whole. 237  Serious contemplation of reparation
claims in the court of global public opinion as well as courts of law may re-open
doors to social healing through justice for others elsewhere. Perhaps for women
suffering war-inflicted sexual violence through gender-sensitive redress. Perhaps
for indigenous peoples struggling to reclaim lands and self-governance. Perhaps
for the descendants of those enslaved and subjected to harsh segregation by law.
Perhaps not, in light of the "underside" risks of reparations process. Perhaps not,
but potentially so.
Conceived as critical legalism, reparations as a key component of redress for
historic injustice is both practical and aspirational. It is practical because
reparatory justice claims, like those of the Mau Mau in Mutua, trigger grassroots
and organizational campaigns for public acknowledgment, government
233 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 388 ("CLS [critical legal studiesl reveals the flexibility of
legal doctrine and invites new consciousness").
234 Id. at 397 (emphasizing the importance of fashioning redress by looking to the victims for guidance).
235 Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara Lee, Korean "Comfort Women" Redress 2012 Through the Lens of U.S. Civil and
Human Rights Reparatory Justice Experiences, 11 J. KOREAN L. 123, 139 (2012) (positing the significance of
"legitimacy of a democracy committed to civil and human rights" as an aspect of redress strategy).
236 See supra Section 111.
237 Of course, continued litigation might result in a formal judgment against the Mau Mau claimants -
factual and legal questions at trial will include the extent to which the British Government is liable directly
for its own actions and indirectly for actions of its colonial government. On the one hand this might
deepen reopened wounds. On the other, the litigation process, illuminated by journalists, scholars and
rights organizations, might transform a narrow adverse legal judgment into expanded public consciousness
with implications for political forms of redress. See Yamamoto et al., Crossroads, supra note 14, at 56
(observing how successful legislative reparations initiatives have been "galvanized and informed" by
"unsuccessful" litigation).
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accountability, and personal and community repair. It is aspirational because, in
Mari Matsuda's words, "reparations is at its heart transformative. It recognizes the
crimes of the powerful against the powerless. It condemns exploitation and adopts
a vision of a more just world."" 8
POSTSCRIPT
As this article was going to press, the British government finalized an
unprecedented out-of-court settlement with the Mau Mau in Mutua, believed to be
first time Britain expressed regret for its colonial era atrocities. 239 Cast in the
language of social healing, British Foreign Secretary William Hague, on behalf of
the government, acknowledged Britain's acts of torture and the resulting "suffering
and injustice," and expressed the country's sincere regret:
I would like to make clear now and for the first time, on behalf of Her
Majesty's Government, that we understand the pain and grievance felt by
those who were involved in the events of the Emergency in Kenya. The
British Government recognises that Kenyans were subject to torture and other
forms of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration. The British
government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place, and that they
marred Kenya's progress towards independence. Torture and ill treatment are
abhorrent violations of human dignity which we unreservedly condemn.
ITIhis settlement provides recognition of the suffering and injustice that took
place in Kenya. . . . and it is my hope that the agreement now reached will
receive wide support, will help draw a line under these events, and will
support reconciliation.
The ability to recognise error in the past but also to build the strongest
nossible foundation for coo eration and friendship in the future are both
hallmarks of our democracy. 4 o
The historic settlement followed intense social scrutiny about the British
government's colonial past and political debate about the import of the High
Court's earlier rulings refusing to dismiss the Mau Mau reparations suit. Through
238 Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 2, at 394.
29 Robyn Dixon & Nicholas Soi, British Government Apologizes for Colonial Abuses in Kenya, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Jun. 6, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/ 2 013/jun/06/world/lafg-britain-kenya-compensate
20130607.
2" William J. Hague MP, Statement to Parliament on Settlement of Mau Mau Claims, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (June 6, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-
parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims [hereinafter Hague, Statement to Parliament]. See also Ian
Cobain & Jessica Hatcher, UK to Expect More Colonial-Era Compensation Claims, THE GUARDIAN (June 6,
2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jun/06/uk-more-colonial-era-compensation-claims
(describing British High Commissioner Christian Turner's "deep expression of regret and
acknowledgement of the wrongs" to an audience of successful claimants in Kenya).
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the settlement, the British government agreed to pay about $31 million
(approximately $5,700 each) to the 5,228 surviving claimants 241 and to construct a
memorial to the victims in Nairobi, Kenya. 242 However, it denied legal liability for
the colonial administration's actions, cautioned that the settlement does not
establish a precedent for other former British colonies, and warned that it would
defend against future claims. 243
As anticipated by Professor Matsuda's initial reparations theorizing and the
later work of fourth generation reparations scholars, Britain's settlement with the
Mau Mau for historic injustice is necessarily forward-looking and much more than
a standard monetary legal judgment: Britain formally acknowledged "torture and
other forms of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration,"
recognized the continuing "pain and grievance felt by those who were involved,"
and committed itself to redress (including monetary compensation, the
construction of a monument, and support for public recognition, reconciliation,
and future cooperation).244 For all practical purposes, the settlement is a political
resolution cast in judicial clothing-that is, a political step toward reconciliation
engendered by still pending reparations litigation.
Indeed, for some, the group-based settlement, with its fourth generation
language of reconciliation, is transformative. Mzee Gitu Wakahengeri, head of the
Mau Mau War Veterans Association and survivor of the atrocities, calls the
settlement the "beginning of reconciliation between the Mau Mau freedom
fighters of Kenya and the British government. 2 45  Matheng Irengi, one of the
successful claimants, also acknowledges the long-lasting impact of the settlement:
"Forget the money they're going to give us. Money comes and goes but the word
sorry will last for ever."246
The settlement is also aspirational because it may further open political doors
to social healing through justice for others in Kenya and elsewhere (despite Britain's
14' Dixon & Soi, supra note 239.
242 Mau Mau Torture Victims to Receive Compensation - Hague, BBC NEWS UK (une 6, 2013, 11:54 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22790037.
243 UK to Compensate Kenya's Mau Mau Torture Victims, THE GUARDIAN (une 6, 2013, 8:22 AM)
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/uk-compensate-kenya-mau-mau-torture.
244 See Hague, Statement to Parliament, supra note 240. But cf. Olive Burrows, Don't Focus on the Money,
British Envoy Tells Mau Mau, CAPITAL NEWS (une 14, 2013),
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/06/dontfocus-on-the-money-british-envoy-tells-mau-mau/
(quoting British High Commissioner Christian Turner as stating that the settlement is limited to "this
particular group of veterans" for a specific "set of personal injury claims").
245 Gregory Warner, Britain Apologizes For Colonial-Era Torture Of Kenyan Rebels, NPR (une 9, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/06/09/189968998/britain-apologizes-for-colonial-era-torture-of-kenyan-rebels.
246 Cobain & Hatcher, supra note 240 (reporting the Mau Mau claimants' lawyer saying: "The elderly
victims of torture now at last have the recognition and justice they have sought for many years. For them
the significance of this moment cannot be over-emphasised"). Some, however, viewed the settlement
amount as too small. See Warner, supra note 245 (noting that some were not satisfied with the modest
amount of the settlement); Dixon & Soi, supra note 239 (reporting that the veterans association accepted
the settlement because they feared the appeal would take too long); Rawlings Otieno & Caroline Rwenji,
Victims: Cash Not Enough But Better Than Nothing, STANDARD DIGITAL (une 7, 2013),
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/articlelD=2000085379&story-title=victims-cash-not-enough-but-better-
than-nothing&pageNo= 1.
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refusal to view the settlement as legal precedent). Another 8,061 Mau Mau have a
pending case in the High Court seeking damages for personal injury and losses
from torture, mistreatment, forced labor and wrongful detention.2 47 The British
Foreign Office was also put on notice that Cypriots will file a claim alleging
mistreatment during the 1950s decolonization conflict in Cyprus.248
As predicted by the expanded social healing framework's "underside of
reparations process," however, some criticize the settlement and warn of the limits
of the reparations claiming process going forward. Although the settlement
amount is modest, the "ideology of reparations" highlights the settlement's
separation of the Mau Mau into "haves" and "have nots." Only 5,228 victims are
slated to receive compensation, leaving many others-perhaps up to 15,000-
"anxious" to receive redress. 249 "The distorted legal framing of reparations claims"
underscores the risks in similarly framed reparations lawsuits. Practical obstacles
like the statute of limitations, the unavailability of historical evidence, and the
absence of expert forensic analysis, may allow judges to reject other reparations
suits at the procedural threshold.2 50
Still, some Mau Mau, while accepting the symbolic nature of the monetary
award, see the healing power of Britain's acknowledgment of its past injustices. As
Mau Mau freedom fighter Mzee Gitu Wakahengeri recognized, "no amount of
compensation [] can cover for the loss we suffered. But the fact that the U.K.
government has acknowledged and accepted that something bad happened and
regret is given[, I the simple apology statement is enough for us." 25 1
247 It's Not Over As 8,000 More Seek Mau Mau Cash, ALLAFRICA (June 10, 2013)
http://m.allafrica.com/stories/201306100742.html/ (noting the existence of a third lawsuit on behalf of
700 Mau Mau); Mau Mau Torture Victims to Receive Compensation - Hague, supra note 242.
248 Cobain & Hatcher, supra note 240.
9 It's Not Over, supra note 247 (reporting that the settlement "has created anxiety with all Mau Mau
victims expecting to receive payments" and that "the actual number of those entitled to compensation may
be in the region of 15,000").
..o Cobain & Hatcher, supra note 240 (noting that other claims for colonial abuses may face obstacles
because damages claims arising from events before June 1954 cannot be brought in British courts);
Caroline Elkins, Britain Has Said Sorry to the Mau Mau. The Rest of the Empire is Still Waiting, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/06/britainmaumau
empire-waiting (observing that for other potential lawsuits, "the chances of descendants of victims filing
successful claims are slim, and the watermark for overcoming the statute of limitations is exceedingly high,
as is the amount of historical evidence and expert forensic analysis").
25 Dixon & Soi, supra note 239.
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